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We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located
players, to the counter intuitive Braess’ paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consid-
eration in generic networks where the addition of a zero cost edge decreases the efficiency of the
network. A quantization scheme applicable to non-atomic routing games is applied to the canonical
example of the network used in Braess’ Paradox. The quantum players are modeled by simulating
repeated game play. The players are allowed to sample their local payoff function and update their
strategies based on a selfish routing condition in order to minimize their own cost, leading to the
Wardrop equilibrium flow. The equilibrium flow in the classical network has a higher cost than the
optimal flow. If the players have access to quantum resources, we find that the cost at equilibrium
can be reduced to the optimal cost, resolving the paradox.
PACS numbers:
It is becoming increasingly important to consider con-
gestion of information in communication networks. In
ad-hoc mobile networks, that may change dynamically
with nodes that act independently of one another, it can
be particularly difficult to efficiently route information.
In many contexts, game theory is a powerful tool for an-
alyzing such problems [1]. Game theory is used to solve
for the equilibrium flow of information when each node
acts independently and routes information selfishly. The
equilibrium may not be the desired flow from the point
of view of a total global cost. The goal of designing a
network protocol is to ensure that the equilibrium flow is
close to the optimal flow.
As quantum networking hardware begins to come on-
line [2, 3], it may be possible for network games to
take advantage of the benefits that quantum games have
shown over classical games. By incorporating quantum
information into a game setting, quantum games may
have different equilibria that can outperform their clas-
sical counterpart[4]. Entanglement shared between dif-
ferent nodes of the network allows the players to have
correlated outcomes even in the absence of communica-
tion. This leads to the quantum game sampling a larger
space of probability distributions that can realize equi-
libria resembling classical correlated equilibria which are
only possible in classical games when the players receive
advice[5].
There have been a few previous examples of quanti-
zation schemes of classical routing games. The games
have been simplified and the strategy choices restricted
so that they map onto the prisoners’ dilemma[6, 7] where
the well-known quantum solution outperforms the clas-
sical one [8]. Pigou’s example was also mapped onto the
prisoners’ dilemma where an entangled pair was shared
between two players at the same node[9]. Since the entan-
glement is at one node, this approach cannot not take full
advantage of the non-local characteristics of quantum en-
tanglement for larger networks. A notable example used
Bell pairs to avoid packet collisions in a software defined
networking simulation of an atomic routing game[10]. In-
spired by the deep connection between Bell’s inequalities
and Bayesian quantum games[11], by mapping the prob-
ability distributions of the possible routing paths onto
Bell’s inequalities, the load-balancing of ad-hoc networks
can be improved by using quantum correlations.
The present work aims to provide a more gen-
eral framework for non-atomic quantum routing games.
The Eisert, Wilkens, Lewenstei quantization scheme
(EWL)[8] is applied to non-atomic routing games and
we look at the consequences of selfish routing when there
is no restriction on the players’ strategy choices. This
scheme would be applicable to a classical information
network which has an overlaid quantum network. We
assume that the nodes of the network share many sets
of entangled particles that are distributed prior to the
game. Other than the communication required to estab-
lish entanglement, the players do not communicate and
do not receive advice from the referee. The players query
the quantum network, apply their strategy choices, and
make routing decisions for the classical network based on
the results of a measurement on the quantum network.
We find that the quantum network has an equilibrium
under selfish routing that performs better than a purely
classical network. This approach resloves the well-known
Braess’ paradox from classical network theory and serves
as a proof of principle that quantum networks may en-
able more efficient routing on classical networks due to
their ability to realize quantum correlations.
Routing games are formulated as a collection of source-
sink pairs in a directed graph. Flow on the graph rep-
resents traffic or information flow over a communication
network. We model a non-atomic game where the infor-
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2mation is divided in continuous units, with the total flow
from the source to the sink normalized to 1. The players
of the game can be interpreted as each infinitesimal unit
of information at each node being routed through the net-
work. Since each player acts independently in their own
interest, it is natural to analyze this in a game theoretical
context.
Each edge in the graph has a time delay, or latency,
L[f ], associated with it, which is a function of the flow
on that edge, f . The latency serves as the cost function
of the game. The selfish routing case is where the players
try to minimize their own latency, or equivalently, when
they try to equalize the latency of each of their outgoing
paths [12]. This leads to the Wardrop equilibrium (which
is analogous to the Nash equilibrium in standard game
theory) [13]. Analytically the equilibrium flow, {fe} is
the set of flows that satisfies [14]:
min
(∑
j
∫ fj
0
Lj [z]dz
)
(0.1)
Where the sum is over all j edges or channels.
The total cost of a set of flows can be measured as the
average cost for all flows on a network and is given by
the sum of the latency on each edge multiplied by the
amount of flow on that edge:
CT [f ] =
∑
j
fjL[fj ] (0.2)
The optimal flow, {fo}, is the set of flows that produce
the global minimum of Eqn. 0.2. This flow is optimal
from a societal perspective as it minimizes the average
cost. If not equal to the equilibrium flow, the optimal
flow is only accessible if the players agree to cooperate
through some central mechanism such as shared advice,
or a contract. A useful metric in congestion games is the
price of anarchy, (κ) which is the ratio of the total cost at
the Wardrop equilibrium to the total cost of the optimum
flow κ = CT [fe]/CT [fo]. The cost of the optimal flow
does not change when the game is quantized, rather, the
goal is to structure the game so that the price of anarchy
approaches 1.
The counter intuitive Braess’ paradox arises from the
intuition that a new, zero cost, link in a network will only
improve the efficiency of the network. It is formulated on
a four node network with source s and sink t, as seen in
Fig. 1. The paths s→ u and v → t have a latency equal
to the amount of flow on the edge, while the paths s→ v
and u→ t have constant latency equal to 1.
If the path through nodes u and v does not exist, the
equilibrium flow of the network is with the flow equally
shared on the two possible paths, s → u → t and
s → v → t with a CT = 3/2. This is also the optimal
flow, giving the network κ = 1. If one tries to improve the
performance of the network by adding the bi-directional
zero cost edge between u→ v the equilibrium flow actu-
ally has a higher total cost of CT = 2 as each player tries
FIG. 1: Braess’ paradox
to take advantage of the lowest cost path s→ u→ v → t.
The optimal flow is the same as the optimal flow without
the central node, and therefore κ = 4/3. The paradox is
exemplified as the addition of a zero cost node increases
the price of anarchy from 1 to 4/3.
Braess’ Paradox [15] is a historically interesting exam-
ple which has several real world analogues[16] including
communication networks, transport networks [17], biol-
ogy, and even has an analogue in a physical system of
strings and springs [18].
To quantize the game in the EWL quantization
scheme, one qubit is assigned to each node where a player
has to chose which direction to route the information,
s, u and v in this case. The state of the players’ qubits is
initialized to |000〉. An N qubit entangling operation is
performed between the three nodes [19, 20]:
JN (γ) = e
iγσx⊗N (0.3)
The amount of entanglement is parametrized by γ, which
is maximal at γ = pi/2 and zero at γ = 0.
Next, the players at each node apply an arbitrary uni-
tary rotation to their qubits which serves as their strategy
choice. An arbitrary rotation can be written:
Uˆ(θ, φ, α) =
(
e−ıφCos(θ/2) eıαSin(θ/2)
−e−ıαSin(θ/2) eıφCos(θ/2)
)
(0.4)
In practice, we place no restriction on the parameters
θ, φ, or α since a winding in phase only produces re-
dundant strategy choices, which do not compromise our
analysis.
Finally, an un-entangling operation J†(γ) is performed
on the qubits and the resulting state is measured.
3For each qubit, the two possible measurement out-
comes are associated with the two outgoing paths from
the node, and the expectation value of the measured
qubit determines the amount of information it routes
along each path as a fraction of the information that
is incoming to the node. This determines the flow along
each of the paths, which is then used to calculate the
latencies along each path and the total cost of the flow.
Symbolically, the flows are a function of the expectation
values of final state, f [〈ψf |ψf 〉], which is a function of the
player’s strategy choices and the entangling parameter,
|ψf [θs, φs, αs, θu, φu, αu, θv, φv, αv, γ]〉.
To model selfish behavior, we simulate a repeated game
where players update their strategy choice based on a ’no-
regrets’ condition on their local latencies, which should
converge on the Wardrop equilibrium [21]. The no-
regrets condition states that an equilibrium is obtained
if no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally al-
tering their strategy choice. Thus, we allow the players
to locally sample the cost function as they adjust each
of the 3 parameters in their strategy choice in order to
approximate the local slope of the cost function to order
to update their strategy choice to minimize the difference
between latencies of their two outgoing paths.
After each round, they are given their expected cost
function, i.e. for player s, the difference of latencies of
the outgoing paths is δLs[|ψf 〉] = Lsu(fsu) − Lsv(fsv).
Then the local derivative of the cost function is ap-
proximated by keeping all other 8 strategy choice pa-
rameters fixed, and changing only 1. For example,
player s updates the parameter θs by computing δLθs =
δLs[|ψf [θs → (θs + d)]〉], where d is a small parameter.
The players then update each of their strategy choices
for the (n+ 1)th round of the game by adjusting the pa-
rameter to lower the latency differences of its outgoing
paths with a learning parameter, or gain, M , i.e.:
θ(n+1)s = θ
(n)
s −M(δLs − δLθs) (0.5)
This is done for all three strategy parameters {θ, φ, α}
of all three players {s, u, v}. The players initially choose
random {θ, φ, α}, and the game is repeated until an equi-
librium is reached.
We simulate the full network from Fig. 1, including
the central 0 cost edge, as the graph with no central edge
is already optimal with κ = 1, and cannot be improved
with quantum players. An example run of the simulation
is shown on the left side of Fig. 2. The simulations
are typically is performed with 400 iterations, a gain of
M = 10, and d = 0.01. The example shown is for a
partially entangled initial state γ = pi/4. The total cost
of the flow is plotted on the left, the fact that the total
cost comes to a fixed value shows that the algorithm does
indeed lead to an equilibrium flow.
The graph on the right of Fig. 2 plots the values of
the 9 strategy parameters. The strategy parameters also
come to stable values. Occasionally, strategy parameters
can appear to run off and not stabilize, as do two that
appear in Fig. 2. This can be either because they are ei-
ther irrelevant to the equilibrium, they maintain a fixed
difference to another strategy parameter, or they later
converge outside of the bounds of the graph. Each of
these possibilities were seen in different runs of the sim-
ulation. It is possible for parameters to be irrelevant to
the game due to the structure of the strategy matrix Eq.
0.4, where for example, when θ = 0, α is undefined.
Each run of the simulation produces different final val-
ues for the equilibrium strategy parameters, though the
cost at the equilibrium is always the same. The equilib-
rium value for one of the strategy parameters is shown
for 100 different runs in the the inset on the left of Fig.
2. This is not surprising, as games quantized in the
EWL scheme with arbitrary strategy choices have many
equilibria, and are often defined as a fixed difference be-
tween parameters, rather than the value of the parame-
ters themselves [22].
In Fig. 3, we plot the cost at equilibrium found for
simulations with varying amounts of entanglement. For
γ = 0, the equilibrium flow is the same as in the clas-
sical case. This is demonstrative of the fact that it is
a properly quantized game. This also proves that the
Braess’ paradox remains in the quantum network even
when a much wider set of strategy choices is allowed.
The total cost at equilibrium has a minimum at γ = pi/4
and is equal to the optimal cost, which resolves the para-
dox. It is interesting to note that at maximal entangle-
ment, Braess’ paradox is recovered, as the equilibrium
flow again goes to the value in the classical game, with a
price of anarchy approaching 1.33. The optimal value of
entanglement to take full advantage of the quantum cor-
relations is not the maximal entanglement, but rather,
half entanglement.
At γ = pi/4, though the strategy choices may be differ-
ent for each run of the simulation, the flow always con-
verges to 0.5 flow on all edges (except for u → v which
has fuv = fvu = 0), and thus has a total cost at equilib-
rium equal to the optimal cost and κ = 1.
For comparison, other networks were simulated with
the same topology but different edge latencies. We sam-
pled constant, linear, and quadratic latencies for the var-
ious edges. If, for a given network, the price of anarchy
in the classical game was unity, κC = 1, it was in the
quantum game as well, i.e. κQ = 1. In cases with a clas-
sical price of anarchy κC > 1, the quantum version had
a price of anarchy κC > κQ > 1. For the networks which
are symmetric such that Lsu = Lsv and Lut = Lvt, the
quantum equilibrium is optimal, i.e. κQ = 1. When the
network is asymmetric, the optimal flow does not have
equal flows on all channels. Yet, the new quantum equi-
librium flow stall has f = 0.5 in all channels except the
central channel. As a result, the cost at equilibrium is
not optimal, though it does outperform the classical one.
These simulations show that the quantum network per-
forms at least as well as the classical network, and many
cases better. Further, even in the presence of asymme-
try, the new symmetric quantum equilibrium flow is still
4FIG. 2: A typical instantiation of the simulated repeated game for γ = pi/4, with a gain of M = 10 and d = 0.01. Left: the
total cost is plotted as a function of the repeated game iteration. It can be seen that total cost converges to an equilibrium,
which is close to the optimal flow CT = 1.5. Right: the value of the various strategy parameters are plotted. Most of the
parameters converge to an equilibrium and a few run off. The inset on the left shows the equilibrium value of one of the strategy
parameters for repeated runs of the simulation.
FIG. 3: The total cost of the flow after an equilibrium has
been reached is plotted as a function of the entanglement, γ.
We simulated 400 iterations of the repeated game, with a gain
of M and d = 0.01.
stable and performs better than the classical equilibrium.
The present scheme relies on the distribution of entan-
gled particles between the nodes of the network and a
central referee. This certainly requires communication,
though the type of communication required is only to
establish the entanglement, and does not broadcast any
information about the players’ intentions. After this en-
tanglement is established, there is no communication nec-
essary to establish the quantum correlations between the
remote nodes.
This scheme does require the nodes to transmit their
quantum particle to the referee in order for the un-
entangling operation, though by interlacing additional
qubits in a manner similar to quantum cryptography
schemes, it should be possible to incorporate the ideas of
physical security enabled by quantum information prin-
ciples into these protocols. So that, even though some
form of connection between nodes must remain in place,
that connection can be made to be secure against attacks.
The security aspects of quantum information could pro-
vide additional motivations for incorporating quantum
game ideas into classical networking protocols.
Though something resembling the present scheme
would likely require far more quantum resources than
will be available in the near future, it serves as a proof
of principle that quantum game ideas may be useful in
improving the efficiency of classical networks when the
players are allowed to act in their self interest. Another
important consideration that work demonstrates is that
a quantum network can exhibit the Braess’ Paradox even
for maximally entangled states. Thus, quantum network-
ing schemes may necessarily have to incorporate these
types of counter intuitive behaviours into their analysis
of network performance. When quantum networks come
online, quantum game theory may provide novel solu-
tions to common networking problems and may become
a necessary tool for analyzing the behavior of the net-
work.
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